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Abstract - This paper is concerned about the adoption of work teams and the factors that facilitate team 
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 1 Introduction
The recent wave of renewed interest, among academics, business and policy
communities, in the transformation of work organization has engendered a
lively debate about the nature and implication of modern forms of industrial
relations. The intensi￿cation of international competition has made many
to believe that in order to gain a competitive edge in an ever changing busi-
ness environment ￿rms must change the way they organize the production
of goods or services. The modern form of industrial relations is envisioned
to be di⁄erent from the traditional practice of hierarchical management sys-
tem, narrowly de￿ned job, little or no discretion on the part of workers.
Rather, the new forms of capitalist production give greater autonomy to
workers, place higher responsibility on lower level workers, giving them rele-
vant decision making powers, and encourage cooperation instead of competi-
tion among the workers. And at the ￿rm level this new system places greater
thrust on quality rather than quantity of the goods or services it produces.
The observed departure from the traditional labour relation practices has
been viewed by many economists as a move from rigid work rules to a new
set of institutions that gives employers a higher level of ￿ exibility in the or-
ganization of work. Work teams, quality circles and job rotation are used
by the employers to encourage employee participation to achieve larger or-
ganizational goal. It is believed that these practices are the vehicles to bring
together the management expertise, and workers￿knowledge and creativity in
the search for superior production routines. These alternative forms of work
organization have received tremendous appreciation from some commenta-
tors as being able to result in higher productivity, better ￿rm performance,
and a happier and more productive labour force. Yet the application of these
new forms of work organization is not wide spread, which is at odds with what
one would predict considering the perceived bene￿ciary e⁄ects of applying
them. So, it might be appropriate to ask why the performance enhancing
approach has not been widely pursued, and what determines the adoption of
such workplace practices. As to these questions, the theoretical views have
been all but a unifying theme. Some view industry, technology and mar-
ket condition to be determining factors of adoption of new forms of work
organization. Yet others place more emphasis on the supporting compensa-
tion schemes that give appropriate incentive to the workers to perform in a
changed environment. This paper analyzes the association of these factors
to the adoption of work teams using establishment level data from UK. In
particular we focus on four factors - trade union, pro￿t sharing, technology
and training - and analyze their association with the adoption of work teams.
1The previous studies that address these issues are Osterman (1994) and
Gittleman et al. (1998). This paper deviates from the earlier literature in
two respects. One, they use an additive index of ￿ exibility in work organiza-
tion, constructed from the presence of di⁄erent work organization practices
like teams, job-rotation, quality-circle and others, as the dependent variable
to estimate the association between di⁄erent factors and the change in work
organization. This method of constructing the index is more of a simpli-
fying technique than a logical formulation stemming from a theory. Often
economic theory can guide to construct an index that incorporates elements
from several dimensions of organizational change - such as team based work
organization is hypothesized to ￿t best with shared modes of compensation.
However, an index of ￿ exibility that incorporates elements along a single
dimension can be misleading if there is complementarity or substitutability
among the elements. Having said so, we also recognize the conceptual di¢ -
culty in constructing a suitable index of change in work organization, since
it requires information about the implementation of work practices in spe-
ci￿c contexts in order to understand the ￿ exibility they generate to cope up
with changes in other dimensions. However, though a broad picture emerges
from this approach, in terms of association of the index to the factors hy-
pothesized, conclusion about the e⁄ect of these factors on the adoption of
speci￿c work practices, that constitute the index, can not be directly drawn,
since there is no reason to believe that the factors a⁄ect all the work prac-
tices in the same direction. When they do not, the estimate is convoluted
by di⁄erent opposing e⁄ects. In order to circumvent this problem, in this
paper we focus on a single work organization practice, teams, to examine
the association of di⁄erent factors to its adoption. This allows us to draw
unambiguous conclusion about the e⁄ects of the factors on the likelihood of
adopting work teams. Second, the estimation method used commonly in the
literature is a parametric model, either a logit or a probit, without any test
of the model speci￿cation. We use probit and a semiparametric estimation
method, in order to compare results from both methods. It turns out from
the speci￿cation tests that probit is not the right speci￿cation of the data
generating process. We ￿nd from semiparametric estimates that among the
factors considered training is the main determinant of the adoption of work
teams.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews
the theoretical views that have implication for the adoption of participatory
practices or organizational change in general. The third section describes our
data. The fourth section is concerned about estimation methods. We give
brief description of parametric probit estimation method and the semipara-
2metric method of Klein and Spady (1993). The ￿fth section gives estimation
results and speci￿cation test for the parametric probit model. The last sec-
tion concludes the paper.
2 Background Discussion
This section draws on several pieces of theory that help to understand the
relationship between trade union, pro￿t sharing, technology, and training on
one side and the adoption of work teams or organizational change in general
on other side.
2.1 Trade Union:
A theoretical perspective on how organizational changes occur can be found
in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982). The evolutionary per-
spective suggests that the established pattern of operation of a routine in
an organization is often tacit and ingrained in the collective knowledge of
the organization. Since organizational changes disrupt this collective knowl-
edge, they are infrequent and subject to selection process. The organizational
changes can occur in two ways ￿organization￿ s search for superior routines
and trial and error experimentation. In either way, the changes that result
in positive gains for the organization are retained. The trail and error ex-
perimentation is often a chaotic and probabilistic process whose occurrence
can not be easily amenable. And in the search process, organizations often
look to the familiar technologies and organizational practices in the neigh-
bourhood. In both the approaches, organization is subject to certain level of
inertia (Pil and MacDu¢ e 1996).
Both with trial and error approach, and localized search, the adoption
and the success of a new routine depend on the cooperation of the workers
whose jobs are directly a⁄ected by the new routine. It is important for the
management to secure workers￿compliance, particularly that of trade union,
for the adoption of new practices. Though on the management￿ s part imitat-
ing the practices in the neighborhood can be justi￿ed as industry standard,
frequent use of trial and error method can face union resistance because the
changes disrupt the tacit and collective knowledge of the organization that
ease the jobs of a larger section of workers. However, the relationship between
3the trade union and the change in work organization is not apparent. It is
possible to ￿nd two equally prominent view on the relation, drawing from
the debate on the e⁄ect of trade unionism on economic performance. The
neoclassical school tends to focus on the monopoly view of trade unionism.
The conceptual contents of this school is derived from the free functioning of
market economy, where the market forces ensure the most e¢ cient and pro-
ductive utilization of labour. In this framework, the trade union is viewed
as a source of imperfection, that keeps the market price of labour above the
social opportunity costs. A corollary of this thesis is that in addition to
keeping the wage rate higher than the market clearing rate, the trade union
imposes restrictive work rules.
There are several reasons to cast doubt on this view. The neoclassical
approach has at its core an abstract model of perfectly competitive economy,
and the believe that the "￿rst-best" outcome is attainable by removing the
sources of imperfection. The proposition is limited to a static consideration
of allocative e¢ ciency. Nolan and Marginson (1990) note that in contrast to
the static framework on which the neoclassical school draws, consideration
of dynamic structure can shed light on the way the trade union plays a key
role in shaping the economic outcome in one direction rather than another.
Moreover, the neoclassical analysis of trade union is premised on the idea
that the employment relationship will be characterized by shared interest,
harmony and cooperation in the absence of trade union. This view is at odds
with the ￿ndings of the classical writers that the employment relationship is
characterized by the exchange of wages for human capacities and not some
prespeci￿ed quantity of performed labour. Hence, there remains plenty of
scope for con￿ ict, opportunism over the amount, quality and range of tasks
to be performed after the labour exchange has been consummated.
On the other hand, the institutional school stressed the voice function of
the trade union. Moving from the static framework to a repeated interaction
model, the proponents of institutional school suggest that by closing o⁄ the
routes to increased pro￿tability by means of wage-cutting and labour inten-
si￿cation the trade union can act as a spur to investment in new and more
e⁄ective production systems (Freeman and Medo⁄1984). This might lead to
investment in human resources and associated change in work organization.
Another channel through which the union can a⁄ect the change in work
organization is its e⁄ect on the workers￿turnover rate. For ￿rms, considering
a switch over from the traditional hierarchical system to a participatory work
organization, turnover is a major concern, since the frequent change in the
4composition of the participatory group can be costly and an impediment to
achieve the desired outcome from the group. The trade union, by providing
a voice to workers￿discontent, can reduce the probability that individual
workers exercise the exit option in case of discontent. Freeman (1980) shows
that unionized organizations in the United States have lower quits and sepa-
rations, and higher tenure than their non-unionized counter parts. Lucifora
(1998) ￿nds similar evidence from establishment level data of Italy. It is also
likely that if the union can bargain a wage higher than that of alternative
employment, turnover will be lower.
2.2 Training:
It is often argued that a trained workforce reduces the cost of changing the
way work is organized within an organization. A better trained workforce
gives the employer higher level of ￿ exibility in assigning tasks to the employ-
ees, hence the opportunity to experiment with new routines. Apart from
cost considerations, other functions of training can facilitate organizational
change. The prime candidates are the e⁄ects on turnover and employee com-
mitment. There is considerable empirical evidence that employee training
reduces turnover. The employer concern for turnover is likely to be higher in
participatory system than in a scienti￿c management system. Job matching
and screening arguments suggest that ￿rms may use induction and training
as a signalling mechanism to attract better quality workers. And continuous
on-the-job training for a good worker/job match is provided so that training
is associated with longer tenure (Barron et al. 1989). Firm speci￿c train-
ing promotes organizational citizenship that is more important for the e⁄ec-
tiveness of participatory work practices than for the centralized monitoring
practices. Some form of training such as training to perform multiple tasks
are complementary to the participatory work organization. Lynch and Black
(1998) show that training is associated with the presence of high-performance
work practices in U.S. establishments.
2.3 Compensation:
It is a common theme in the literature on modern manufacturing that em-
ployee participation and shared mode of compensation are complementary
to each other (Milgrom and Roberts 1995, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994).
The argument is that the bene￿t of work teams are enhanced by having
an incentive scheme that conditions individual compensation on the group
5performance. The theoretical debate on the issue has a long standing in eco-
nomics. It represents two competing views - the earlier literature￿ s focus on
famous 1
N problem (Holmstrom 1982) and the recent literature￿ s search for
conditions where the problem is mitigated (Kandel and Lazear 1992, Che and
Yoo 2002). The relevance of the free-riding problem is challenged by appeal-
ing to mutual monitoring and peer pressure aspects of participatory work
practices and pro￿t sharing scheme. However, the argument that the mutual
monitoring function of pro￿t sharing is an e⁄ective device to mitigate free-
riding problems does not ￿nd much empirical support (Gaynor and Gertler
1995, Prendergast 1999). Che and Yoo (2002) show that the e⁄ectiveness
of pro￿t sharing depends on the complementarity of the e⁄ort choices of the
team members. The e⁄ectiveness derives from the increased ability to punish
in an in￿nitely repeated game. If the e⁄ort levels are complementary, as is
likely to be the case in participatory work practices, the incentive e⁄ect of
pro￿t sharing more than o⁄set the free-riding e⁄ect.
2.4 Technology:
The technology dependence of team adoption is pronounced by several econo-
mists. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) maintain that team production arises
when the output is not separable in contributions of individual inputs or
when the total output from cooperative inputs is high enough than the sum
of separable outputs to cover the cost of monitoring and disciplining the input
behavior. The technology of an organization often de￿nes the set of feasible
work organization practices. In a Tayloristic technological set up, it is often
argued, most of the jobs are routine works and there is little opportunity
on the part of workers to put discretionary e⁄orts. Hence, the participatory
work practices are less likely to be adopted in such a set up. On the other
hand, the post Taylotistic production methods exploits both the manage-
ment expertise and workers knowledge of the jobs they perform. Hence, the
technological change from the former to latter is more likely to be associated
with the adoption of new work organization practices. The new technology
may constitute an example of what Pil and MacDu⁄e (1996) refer to as an
￿unfreezing￿of the existing way of doing business, that is, a disruption that
moves the organization away from the status quo. At such times, the cost of
experimenting may be lower, since the organization is likely to be in a state
of ￿ ux away.
6                                            Table 1: Variable definition and descriptives
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Team 1 if almost all (80% or more) employees of largest occupational 0.5221 0.4998
group work in teams, 0 otherwise
Size Number of employees 322.7773 1133.6530
Union Density Number of union members / Size 26.0216 33.4546
Profit Pay 1 if profit sharing scheme for largest occupational group 0.4979 0.5003
0 otherwise
New Technology 1 if new technology in last 12 months 0.8372 0.3694
0 otherwise
Training (Ref. no training)
Training 1-19 1 if 1 to 19% employees had off-the-job training, 0 otherwise 0.2237 0.4170
Training 20-59 1 if 20 to 59% employees had off-the-job training, 0 otherwise 0.2773 0.4479
Training 60-100 1 if 60 or more employees had off-the-job training, 0 otherwise 0.3613 0.4806
Part-time Numebr of part-time employees / Size 0.2151 0.2846
Female Number of female employees / Size 0.4060 0.2604
Industry (Ref. manufacturing)
EG&W 1 if the workplace in Elecetricity, Gas & Water sector, 0 Otherwise 0.0651 0.2469
Construction 1 if in Construction sector, 0 otherwise 0.0525 0.2232
Wholesale & Retail 1 if in Wholesale & Retail sector, 0 otherwise 0.2489 0.4326
Hotel & Restaurant 1 if in Hotel & Restaurant sector, 0 otherwise 0.0819 0.2744
Transport & Communication 1 if in Transport & Communication sector, 0 otherwise 0.0735 0.2611
Financial Services 1 if in Financial Service sector, 0 otherwise 0.0714 0.2577
Other Business Services 1 if in Other Business Service sector, 0 otherwise 0.1460 0.3533
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Data
Data for this study come from the British Workplace Employee Relations
Survey (WERS), 1998. The Workplace Employee Relations Survey1 con-
tains detailed information about labour relations, work organization, com-
pensation and training provision of 2191 British workplaces with 10 or more
employees. Only the private sector workplaces with 25 or more employees
are considered for the present study.
The management questionnaire of the survey asks what percentage of the
workers of the largest occupational group work in formally designated teams.
Answer to this question is allowed to be in several intervals ranging from 0%
to 100%. We construct a binary variable that takes value 1 if almost all
(80% to 100%) of the employees in largest occupational group work in teams
1Department of Trade and Industry, Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service,
Workplace Employee Relations Survey : Cross-Section, 1998 [computer ￿le]. 6th ed.
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 23 January 2001. SN: 3955.
7in the establishment, 0 otherwise. In the empirical analysis that follows we
test several hypothesis regarding adoption of work teams.
The independent variables correspond to the factors discussed in the pre-
vious section, namely - trade union, technological change, training provision
and compensation structure. In order to capture trade union e⁄ect we use
the trade union density in the establishment as control. We also control for
the size and industry e⁄ects in the estimation. Observations with missing
values are omitted, which leads to a valid data set of 952 establishments in
eight industries. Table 1 de￿nes the variables and gives summary statistics.
There are 52% establishments that have work teams. Trade union mem-
bership is little higher in establishments with teams (26.9%) than in estab-
lishments without teams (25.1%). With regard to pro￿t sharing scheme,
teams are less prevalent in establishments with no such scheme (44%) than
in those with (60.6%). Similar is the pattern for new technology. The correla-
tion between teams and o⁄-the-job training is negative for training provision
for less than 20% employees. The correlation becomes positive for training
for higher percentage of employees.
4 Estimation
Since the dependent variable we want to explain - presence of work teams -
takes only two values (0 and 1), we can express the model as
y = 1 if v (x;￿) ￿ u
= 0 otherwise, (1)
where v (:) is a known function (usually assumed to be equal to x￿), x is a
row vector of exogenous variables, ￿ a column vector of unknown parameters,
and u a random disturbance. Let F(ujx) denote the cumulative distribution
of u conditional on x. Then the probability of having teams is
P(y = 1jx;￿) ￿ Pr(u < v(x;￿)jx) = F[v(x;￿)jx] (2)
A standard choice for estimation of this model is to use a probit speci￿cation.
The probit model belongs to a parametric family that assumes the functional
form of the distribution of the random component of the model. In the case
of probit, the assumption is that the distribution of the error term is normal.
The estimates are obtained by maximizing a likelihood (usually log likeli-
hood) function that depends on the parameters of the model. One drawback
8of the parametric estimation is that inconsistent estimates are obtained if
the distribution of the error term is misspeci￿ed. This leads to a search for
estimation methods that do not require specifying the error distribution.
There already exist several semiparametric estimation methods that do
not require distributional assumption. Cosslett (1983) develops a distribution
free consistent estimator. But, this estimator requires that the distribution
of x is known up to ￿nite-dimensional parameters. The approach here is to
choose the unknown distribution function jointly with ￿ to maximize the like-
lihood function. Ichimura (1993), and Klein and Spady (1993) develop N1=2
consistent, asymptotically normal semiparametric estimators of ￿. These
estimators permit certain forms of heteroskedasticity of u. The Klein and
Spady estimator also achieves the asymptotic e¢ ciency bound of Cosslett
(1987). Horowitz (1992) provides a smoothed version of maximum score es-
timator, originally developed by Manski (1975). The smoothed maximum
score estimation allows heteroskedasticity of unknown form, but requires the
assumption that the median of (ujx) is zero. The convergence rate of this
estimator is between N1=3 and N1=5, which can be made arbitrarily close to
N1=2, but that requires rather restrictive assumptions.
In this paper, we consider two estimation methods: probit and semipara-
metric estimation proposed by Klein and Spady (1993). It is important to
note that the Klein and Spady (K-S) estimator has most of the features of
parametric estimators, namely N1=2 consistency, asymptotic normality and
e¢ ciency. It also serves to compare the estimation results with those obtained
from the parametric probit model. The following subsections give a brief de-
scription of the probit maximum likelihood method and the semiparametric
pseudo maximum likelihood method of K-S.
4.1 Probit maximum likelihood
The probit model assumes a normal distribution for F. The maximum like-





yi ln[F(v(x;￿)jx)] + (1 ￿ yi)ln[1 ￿ F(v(x;￿)jx)] (3)
with
F(v(x;￿)jx) = F(x;￿) = ￿(v(x;￿)=￿u)
9where ￿ is the cumulative normal distribution function and ￿2
u the variance
of u. The probit model is identi￿ed only up to a constant scale factor. It is
standard to achieve the scale normalization by setting ￿2
u equal to 1.
4.2 Pseudo maximum likelihood
When F is unknown, Cosslett (1983) proposes to choose F jointly with ￿ to
maximize the likelihood function in (3). Though the resulting estimator is
consistent, once the distribution function is replaced by its ML estimate, the
resulting concentrated likelihood is not a smooth function of ￿. Consequently,
it becomes di¢ cult to establish the asymptotic distribution for the estimator
of ￿. K-S propose to select ￿ so as to maximize a semiparametric likelihood
that is a smooth function of ￿ and that locally (for ￿ in the neighborhood of
￿0, the true value) approximates the corresponding parametric likelihood.
Suppose that the model satis￿es the single index restriction, i.e. E[yjx] =
E[yjv(x;￿)]. Then the quasi-likelihood function that approximates the para-
metric likelihood can be obtained by replacing P[y = 1jv(x;￿)] with a tractable
function P[v(x;￿);￿] that locally approximate it. P[v(x;￿);￿] can be written
as
P[v(x;￿);￿] ￿ Pr[u < v(x;￿)jv(x;￿)]
= Pr[u < v(x;￿)]:gvju<v(x;￿)(v(x;￿))=gv(v(x;￿)) (4)
where Pr[u < v(x;￿)] is the unconditional probability of u < v(x;￿), gvju<v(x;￿)(v(x;￿))
the density of v(x;￿) conditional on u < v(x;￿) and gv(v(x;￿)) the uncon-
ditional density of v(x;￿). It is easy to see that at the true value of the
parameter, ￿0,
Pr[u < v(x;￿)] = Pr[y = 1]
and
gvju<v(x;￿)(v(x;￿) = gvjy=1(v(x;￿)):
So, an estimate for (4) can be obtained by replacing Pr[y = 1] by the sam-
ple proportion of observations with y = 1 and both the densities (conditional
and unconditional) by their nonparametric estimates. A desirable feature
of this formulation is that at ￿ = ￿0, and under single index restriction,
P[v(x;￿);￿] is equivalent to the true probability, i.e.
P[v(x;￿);￿] = Pr[u0 < v(x;￿0)jv(x;￿0)] ￿ Pr[y = 1jv(x;￿0)] = Pr[y = 1jx]:
10In application, Pi[vi(x;￿);￿] can be estimated as follows. Let,
gyv(vi(x;￿);￿) ￿ Pr(y):gvjy(vi(x;￿);￿); (y = 0;1)
and






Now, it remains to estimate gyv(vi;￿) for y = 0;1. K-S propose to es-
timate gyv(:) with kernel function that is symmetric, integrates to one and
has bounded second moment. Kernel can be either bias-reducing or adaptive
with local smoothing. For a bias-reducing kernel K(z), with
R
z2K(z)dz = 0,













, (y = 0;1) (6)
where n is the number of observations and bandwidth hn is such that n￿1=6 ￿
hn ￿ n￿1=8.
In order to ensure uniform convergence, an adjustment factor is used to
guard against small estimated densities. The adjustment factor takes the
following form




z)], z ￿ [(h
b
n ￿ ^ gyv(v;￿))=h
c
n], (y = 0;1).
and
e ￿n ￿ e ￿0y +e ￿1y .
where 0 < b < c and a > 2b + 2c > 0. With these adjustment factors the
estimated probability function is
e P(v;￿) =
^ g1v(v;￿) +e ￿1n(v;￿)
^ gv(v;￿) +e ￿n(v;￿)
(7)
The adjustment factors control the rate at which the numerator and denom-
inator of estimated probability function tend to zero. For small estimated
densities the adjustment factors behave exponentially like ha
n. For su¢ ciently
large estimated densities, the adjustment factors tend exponentially to zero
as no adjustment is required.
11Finally, with an appropriate likelihood trimming function, e ￿(:), the K-S











The trimming sequence is introduced for the sake of the normality argument.
This ensures that the estimated probabilities converges to the true probabil-
ities at a su¢ ciently fast rate. In application, the trimming sequence can be
omitted, and the resulting estimates will still be consistent. The arguments
of the log function have been squared to guard against the fact that with a
bias reducing kernel the estimated densities, hence the estimated probabili-
ties, can be negative. Since this might happen in a ￿nite sample application,
squaring the arguments of the log function ensures that the likelihood func-
tion remains well behaved even in this case.
5 Results and Tests
This section gives our estimation and test results. For all estimation we use
the log of the number employees in a workplace for its size. Table 2 gives
the probit estimates, with standard errors corresponding to the covariance
matrix that is computed from the Hessian and the cross product of the ￿rst
derivatives of the likelihood function2.
The estimated coe¢ cients suggest insigni￿cant e⁄ect of union density on
the adoption of work teams. Pro￿t sharing scheme appears to have signi￿cant
e⁄ects on the adoption of work teams. The coe¢ cient for new technology
is not signi￿cant. Training for more employees is positively associated with
the adoption of work teams. Before interpreting the results, we turn to a
speci￿cation test of probit model based on a nonparametric con￿dence band.
The probit speci￿cation can be tested with a nonparametric estimation
of the con￿dence band. Let ￿p and
P
p denote the maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the parameters and the covariance matrix, respectively, of the probit
model. Let, V (x) = x
P
p x0. If the probit model is the correct description of
the data generating process, a nonparametric regression of y on x￿p=V (x)1=2



























12                    Table 2: Probit estimates
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Intercept -0.9963 0.2608 -3.82
Size 0.0050 0.0427 0.12
Union Density -0.0003 0.0016 -0.21
Profit Pay 0.2519 0.0902 2.79
New Technology 0.1995 0.1173 1.70
Training 1-19 0.1744 0.1496 1.17
Training 20-59 0.5683 0.1473 3.86
Training 60-100 0.8044 0.1463 5.50
Part-time 0.0235 0.2452 0.10
Female 0.4665 0.2526 1.85
EG&W 0.3191 0.1955 1.63
Construction 0.1070 0.2063 0.52
Wholesale & Retail 0.0621 0.1542 0.40
Hotel & Restaurant -0.2618 0.2002 -1.31
Transport & Communication -0.1052 0.1804 -0.58
Financial Services 0.4093 0.1979 2.07
Other Business Services 0.1653 0.1525 1.08
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
￿(:). The statistical signi￿cance of the di⁄erence between the nonparametric
regression curve and ￿(:) can be assessed by constructing a uniform con￿-
dence band for the nonparametric regression function (Horowitz 1993). The
following proposition of Horowitz (1993) outlines the construction of a non-
parametric con￿dence band for the probit model:
Let e F denote the kernel regression of y on x￿p=V (x)1=2. Let the
kernel, K, be a probability density that is symmetrical about
0, has bounded support, and whose ￿rst derivative has bounded
variation. Let the bandwidth be wn = h￿
n, where 1 < ￿ < 5=3
and hn / n￿1=5. Let g(:) denote the probability density function
of x￿=V (x)1=2. Let ^ g denote the kernel estimate of g based on
x￿=V (x)1=2, kernel K, and bandwidth wn. Let S be a closed in-
terval of the real line on which g is strictly positive. Assume that
P(y = 1jx) = ￿(x￿=V (x)1=2) and that g is twice di⁄erentiable.































From this proposition the con￿dence band can be constructed as









where z is such that exp(￿2exp(z)) = 1￿￿, ￿ being the level of signi￿cance.
Figure 1 shows the 95% con￿dence band along with the cumulative normal
distribution. We use a Gaussian kernel, truncated at ￿100 and 100, since
compact support is required by the proposition. Horowitz (1993) notes that
Gaussian kernel can be used if the truncation point is made su¢ ciently large.
The ￿gure shows that a large part the standard normal distribution lies
outside the nonparametric con￿dence band. This indicates that the probit
model is not the right speci￿cation of the data generating process.
The semiparametric estimates are given in table 3. The estimates are
obtained by using 7th order Gaussian kernel3 and bandwidth equal to n￿1=7.




(105 ￿ 105w2 + 21w4 ￿ w6)￿(w)
where w = x￿xi
h and ￿(:) is standard normal density.
14Figure 1: Figure 1: Nonparametric Con￿dence bands
We do not use likelihood trimming sequence, as they are not necessary for
the consistency of the estimates. Intercept is not included since it is not
identi￿ed in K-S estimation method, and normalization is achieved by setting
the coe¢ cient of size equal to one.
The semiparametric estimates give a slightly di⁄erent picture as compared
to that of probit estimates. Trade union density is insigni￿cant. Pro￿t shar-
ing scheme has signi￿cant association with team adoption. The coe¢ cient of
new technology is signi￿cant and positive. Training has positive association
with team adoption, as compared to the omitted group - no training. The
estimates of the training variables shows that the association is stronger the
wider is the provision of training.
Our results show that establishments wide spread employee training facil-
itate the adoption of work teams. The asset based theory of ￿rms conjectures
that competitiveness of ￿rms in global economy is more dependent on quality
of it￿ s workforce than on other easily imitable factor such as technology. The
theory emphasizes that since competitive gains resulting from competence
and distictiveness of the workforce can not be imitated, the workforce ori-
ented competitive edge gives ￿rms a unique way to achieve business success.
The workforce oriented competitive strategy requires that employees work in
15            Table 3: Semiparametric estimates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient S. E. T-statistics
Size 1.0000 . .
Union Density -0.0006 0.0035 -0.18
Profit Pay 0.8598 0.2144 4.01
New Technology 0.4965 0.0524 9.47
Training 1-19 -0.0144 0.0789 -0.18
Training 20-59 0.7934 0.0512 15.49
Training 60-100 1.9012 0.1887 10.07
Part-time 0.6469 0.2963 2.18
Female 0.6027 0.1607 3.75
EG&W 0.4670 0.0919 5.08
Construction -0.2790 0.1278 -2.18
Wholesale & Retail 0.0794 0.0609 1.30
Hotel & Restaurant -0.1091 0.0722 -1.51
Transport & Communication -0.8747 0.1405 -6.23
Financial Services -0.2315 0.2946 -0.79
Other Business Services -0.1574 0.0616 -2.56
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
an environment that promote their discretionary e⁄ort and creativity. The
training for the workforce plays a important role in shaping their practical
and creative knowledge in a way that obtains organizational goals. Our ￿nd-
ing that training is the most important factor associated with work teams is
consistent with the asset based theory of ￿rms.
These results are not readily comparable to other studies on the same
issue, for two reasons (as has been mentioned before): others use a composite
index of organizational change and the estimation methods employed by them
have invariably been parametric, without any speci￿cation test. However,
the union e⁄ects in Gittleman et al. (1998) and in Osterman (1994) are not
signi￿cant. The training e⁄ect in our paper is consistent with their ￿ndings.
The industry dummies in Gittleman et al. (1998) are negative signi￿cant
( with respect to the omitted group, manufacturing). In our results we
￿nd that though establishments in some sectors (Construction, Transport &
Communication, and Other Business Services) are less likely to adopt work
teams, those in Electricity, Gas & Water sector are more likely to adopt work
teams compared to manufacturing sector.
166 Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of adoption of a commonly used form of work
organization - work teams. It tests the empirical relevance of several pieces of
theory that relates team adoption to trade unionism, technological change,
training provision and shared mode of compensation. Departing from the
common practice of parametric estimation, we estimate the team adoption
using both parametric and semiparametric speci￿cation. The nonparametric
con￿dence band test rejects the normality assumption of the probit model.
However, the probit estimates are qualitatively similar to the semiparametric
estimates except for pro￿t sharing.
The semiparametric estimates show that trade union density is not associ-
ated to team adoption. The largely believed implication of complementarity
(between work teams and share mode of compensation) hypothesis is sup-
ported by our ￿ndings. However, in line with others, we ￿nd that adoption
of new technology and more training is associated with adoption of work
teams. It is evident that establishments in the manufacturing industry are
more likely to have work teams than those in other industries. However, our
￿ndings show that the establishments in Electricity, Gas & Water sector are
more likely to have teams than manufacturing establishments.
References
[1] Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1972), Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 62, 777-
795.
[2] Barron, J. M., Black, D. A. and Loewenstein, M. A. (1989).
Job matching and on-the-job training. Journal of Labor Economics 7,
1-19.
[3] Che, Y. and Yoo, S. (2002). Optimal incentives for teams. American
Economic Review 91, 525-541.
[4] Cosslett, S. R. (1983), Distribution-free maximum likelihood estima-
tion of binary choice model. Econometrica 51, 765-782.
[5] Cosslett, S. R.(1987), E¢ ciency bounds for distribution-free estima-
tors of binary choice and censored regression models. Econometrica 55,
551-586.
17[6] Freeman, R. B. (1980). The exit-voice tradeo⁄ in the labor mar-
ket: Unionism, job tenure, quits, and separations. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 94, 643-673.
[7] Freeman, R. B. and Medo⁄, H. (1984). What do unions do? New
York: Basic Books.
[8] Gaynor, M. and Gertler, P. J. (1995). Moral hazard and risk
spreading in partnerships. Rand Journal of Economics 26, 591-613.
[9] Gittleman, M., Horrigan, M. and Joyce, M. (1998), "Flexible"
workplace practices: Evidence from nationally representative survey.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52, 99-115.
[10] Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 13, 324-340.
[11] Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1994). The ￿rm as an incentive
system. American Economic Review 84, 972-991.
[12] Horowitz, J. L. (1993), Semiparametric estimation of a work-trip
mode choice model. Journal of Econometrics 58, 49-70.
[13] Horowitz, J. L. (1992), A smoothed maximum score estimator for
the binary response model. Econometrica 60, 505-531.
[14] Ichimura, H. (1993), Semiparametric least squares (SLS) and
weighted SLS estimation of single-index models. Journal of Economet-
rics 58, 71-120.
[15] Kandel, E. and Lazear, E. P. (1992). Peer pressure and partner-
ships. Journal of Political Economy 100, 801-817.
[16] Klein, R. W. and Spady, R. H. (1993), An e¢ cient semiparametric
estimator for binary response model. Econometrica 61, 387-421.
[17] Lucifora, C. (1998), The impact of unions on labour turnover in Italy:
evidence from establishment level data. International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization 16, 353-376.
[18] Lynch, L. M. and Black, S. E. (1998). Beyond the incidence of
employer-provided training. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52,
64-81.
18[19] Manski, C. (1975), Maximum score estimation of the stochastic utility
model of choice. Journal of Econometrics 3, 205-228.
[20] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1995). Complimentarities and ￿t:
Strategy, structure and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 19, 179-208.
[21] Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of
economic change. Harvard University Press.
[22] Nolan, P. and Marginson, P. (1990), Skating on thin ice? David
Metcalf on trade unions and productivity. British Journal of Industrial
Relations 28, 227-247.
[23] Osterman, P. (1994). How common is workplace transformation and
who adopts it? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47, 175-188.
[24] Pil, F. K. and MacDu¢ e, J. P. (1996). The Adoption of high
involvement work practices. Industrial Relations 35, 423-455.
[25] Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in ￿rms. Journal
of Economic Literature 37, 7-63.
19